home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
Shareware Overload Trio 2
/
Shareware Overload Trio Volume 2 (Chestnut CD-ROM).ISO
/
dir33
/
conspir.zip
/
759FD472.TXT
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1993-07-27
|
7KB
|
146 lines
Charles REED and Roland Duty, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
James TERRELL, et al., Defendants-Appellees
No. 84-1010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
759 F.2d 472
May 6, 1985
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas.
COUNSEL: Charles Reed (Pro Se), 1307 Royal Oaks, Waco, TX 76710,
for Appellants.
Roland B. Duty (Pro Se), 703 N. Valley Mills Dr., Waco, TX
76710, for Appellant/Petitioner.
LaNelle L. McNamara, RepublicBank Tower, Suite 500, 501 Franklin
Ave., Waco, TX 76701, for Appellees.
Larry O. Brady, P.O. Box 1470, Waco, TX 76703, for Appellees.
Hon. Mark White, Atty. Gen.; Jerry L. Benedict, P.O. Box 12548,
State and County Div. Austin, TX 78711, for Appellees.
Donald O. Hall, 504 Austin Ave., Waco, TX 76701, for Appellees.
Steven M. Smoot, Asst. Gen. Consl.; Jerry L. Zunker, State Bar of
TX, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, TX 78711, for Appellees.
OPINIONBY: JOHNSON
OPINION: [*472]
Before RANDALL, JOHNSON, and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.
JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellants Charles Reed and Roland Duty filed this
suit under various statutory provisions, including 42 U.S.C. @@
1983, 1985, and 1986. Reed and Duty claim that their
constitutional rights of due process and equal protection were
violated by the award of attorney's fees to defendants Terrell and
Raybold, who were the attorneys representing the ex-wives of Reed
and Duty in state court divorce and custody proceedings. Reed and
Duty base this claim on their assertion that section 11.18(a) of
the Texas Family Code, although neutral on its face, n1 is
discriminatorily applied by Texas state courts against [*473]
men. Inaddition to the two attorneys, the plaintiffs named as
defendants the Honorable Bill Logue, Judge of the 19th State
District Court (the State district judge who entered the orders
complained of); Joe Johnson, District Clerk for McLennan County
(the district clerk who filed the orders); and the State Bar of
Texas. n2 Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief,
and damages. Plaintiff's particularly sought reversal of the state
PAGE 16 759 F.2d 472, *473
LEXSEE
court awards of attorney's fees against them.
n1 That section provides:
In any proceeding under this subtitle, including, but not
limited to, habeas corpus, enforcement, and contempt proceedings,
the court may award costs. Reasonable attorney's fees may be taxed
as costs, and may be ordered paid directly to the attorney, who may
enforce the order for fees in his own name. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. @
11.18(a) (Vernon Supp.1984).
n2 Plaintiff's alleged that materials published by the State Bar
indicated a conspiracy by members of the State Bar to cause the
provisions of the Texas Family Code concerning legal fees to be
enforced in a discriminatory manner against men. Plaintiffs allege
that such action constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act in that
it overcharges one group of consumers to the benefit of another.
There is no merit to this allegation.
Defendants moved to dismiss. On October 24, 1983, the federal
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss following
a hearing. In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, the
district court noted:
Plaintiff's complaints are framed as civil rights actions
attacking the constitutionality of the judgment entered against
them in the State District Court and the constitutionality of the
Texas statute which authorizes awards of attorneys' fees in
domestic relations cases brought in Texas courts. Although the
complaint is cast as an action seeking redress for civil rights
violations, the essential relief sought is review and reversal of
the state court's judgments against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were
entitled to attack the constitutionality of the judgments and the
statute authorizing the judgments through appeals in the Texas
courts and through appeal or petition for writ of certiorari in the
Supreme Court of the United States. Plaintiffs did not appeal from
the judgments entered against them. . . . This Court does not
have, nor should it take, jurisdiction of actions which seek to
review judgments that should have been attacked directly in a state
court.
In dismissing the plaintiff's actions, the district court did
not err. It is a well-settled principle that a plaintiff may not
seek a reversal in federal court of a state court judgment simply
by casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action.
Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1984)
(no jurisdiction to review state court judgment were appeal taken
through state court system); Sawyer v. Overton, 595 F.2d 252 (5th
Cir. 1979). Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that a "United
States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of
a state court in judicial proceedings." District of Columbia Courtof Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1315, 75
L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983). n3 While a losing party in state court
proceedings may be able in some instances to sue in federal court
to "mount[] a general challenge to the constitutionally" of a state
statute or rule, Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, 103 S. Ct. at 1316, no
such situation is presented in the instant case. As the federal
district court in the instant case noted, the "essential relief"
sought by the plaintiffs is reversal of the state court award of
attorney's fees against them. District Court op. at 1. Indeed,
this Court's review of the record in the instant case reveals that
the plaintiffs' suit is "patently an attempt to collaterally attack
the validity of [the state court judgment]." Almon v. Sandlin, 603
F.2d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Kimball v. Florida Bar, 632
F.2d 1283, 1284 & n. 3 (5th Cir.
PAGE 17 759 F.2d 472, *473
LEXSEE
1980) (federal complaint, in essence, sought reversal of state
court judgment although cast in form of general constitutional
attack). A review of the plaintiffs' pleadings and arguments in
the instant case reveals that this suit is [*474] "inextricably
interwined" with the state court's awards against the plaintiffs.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, n. 16, 103 S. Ct. at 1315, n. 16. Thus,
the district court did not err in dismissing the instant suit for
want of jurisdiction.
n3 Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted that "a petitioner's
failure to raise his constitutional claims in state court does not
mean that a United States District Court should have jurisdiction
over the claims." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, n. 16, 103 S. Ct. at
1315 n.16. Indeed, such failure may lead the party to "forfeit his
right to obtain review of the state court decision in any federal
court." Id.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.